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In his book A Brief History of Time physicist Stephen Hawking tells us that his research in 
cosmology is prompted by his interest in the following questions: Where the universe came 
from; why and how it began, and whether and how it will come to an end.
1 
 He asks why the 
universe goes to the bother of existing; whether the basic theory concerning its existence is 
so compelling that the universe brings about its own existence, or whether the universe 
needs a creator, and if so, whether that creator has any other effect on the universe. Finally 
he asks: if there is such a creator, who created him?
2 
 Hawking's book attempts to make the 
basic ideas about the origin and fate of the universe clear to ordinary people but it is also 
described as "a book about God ... or perhaps about the absence of God", in that on the one 
hand Hawking considers that the discovery of a complete theory of the universe would mean 
one "would know the mind of God", but on the other Hawking concludes with the 
probability of "a universe with no edge in space, no beginning or end in time and nothing for 
a creator to do".
3
 
 
Stephen Hawking is one of the leading figures in 20th century physics and cosmology and, as 
is the case with many other results of current scientific research, his thought reaches and 
influences the outlook not only of those working in other areas of science and scholarship, 
but also of the man-in-the-street. As a result, the world-view of people in earlier periods of 
history is too often seen as out-of-date, necessarily defective or entirely incorrect, with 
plenty of examples of unchallengeable discoveries (such as the fact that the earth goes 
round the sun) to confirm this opinion.
4
 
 
It is therefore perhaps not unfitting that one aim of this paper is to show that such an 
assumption is itself defective. Particularly, I wish to argue that the world-view of a leading 
mind in the 19th century, Søren Kierkegaard, is not only not "out-of-date" but is in fact 
highly relevant to some of the difficulties encountered by Stephen Hawking in his search for 
a unified explanation of the universe.
5 
 In order to show how this can be possible, I will first 
outline Hawking's perspective on the universe and some of the key problems raised; second, 
I will outline Kierkegaard's own conception of the universe with his Christian idea of God; 
and finally I will attempt to show how some of Hawking's difficulties can be dealt with only 
on Kierkegaard's basic assumptions, which latter can also be linked to areas of experience 
excluded by Hawking in his investigations. 
 
Like many other theoretical physicists, Hawking is searching for a final, simple interaction or 
law that will explain "all of the phenomena that surround us", so that we can arrive at "a 
complete understanding of the entire universe".
6 
 In his book, he outlines the history of 
thought about the cosmos, showing how science has moved from Newton's basic 
assumption that time is absolute and the thought that the heavens are stably in balance, to 
the notion of space-time, the universe of Einstein's general and special relativity, and 
Hubble's theory of the Big Bang.
7
 We are shown how the universe seems to operate 
according to several basic sets of rules that act independently in layers. Hawking tells us of 
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the development of the attempt to reconcile the four basic principles: gravity; the strong 
nuclear force that holds the nucleus of an atom together; the electromagnetism that keeps 
electrons in place around the nucleus and makes matter appear solid; and, finally, the weak 
nuclear force responsible for radioactive decay.
8 
 Hawking points out that the universe is 
now described in terms of two basic partial theories that are in fact inconsistent with each 
other: the general theory of relativity and quantum mechanics.
9 
 Thus, although research has 
led to what is known as Grand Unified Theory that makes the relevant connections between 
three of the four basic rules, there is still lacking a complete theory that will include 
gravitational force and thus create the final single unified law. In other words, something is 
needed to reconcile quantum mechanics used for handling matter on a small scale, particles, 
etc., with the general theory of relativity that describes the force of gravity and the large-
scale structure of the universe, a reconciliation that is essential in view of the postulate that 
the universe at its beginning had zero size.
10
 
 
According to Hawking, in striving to achieve such a unified theory that will describe the 
entire universe,
11
 scientists tend to divide the problem into two parts: 1) laws that say how 
the universe changes with time; 2) the question of the initial state of the universe.
12
 As 
Hawking points out, it is the second part of the problem that is particularly controversial, 
and there are those who consider that the question of the initial state of the universe 
belongs to the realm of metaphysics or religion and should not be investigated.
13
 Hawking's 
response to this is to point out that it looks as if the universe is created to "evolve in a very 
regular way according to certain laws", therefore one can suppose that there are also laws 
governing the initial state and he sees no reason why he should not continue to explore the 
question of these laws.
14
 Already in 1970, Hawking and Roger Penrose made a major 
contribution towards the investigation of the origin of the universe when they showed that 
Einstein's general theory of relativity implied that the universe must have a beginning and 
possibly an end. In other words, they took astronomer Edwin Hubble's observations 
concerning a possible initial Big Bang and an ensuing expanding universe a step further by 
proving that the universe must have had a beginning in time and by demonstrating the 
notion of singularity, a point in space-time where mathematics cannot cope with infinite 
numbers, and the general theory of relativity breaks down.
15
 
 
The notion of the Big Bang and an initial singularity has now been generally accepted, and 
corresponding to this idea is the notion of a possible "big crunch", where the universe begins 
to cease its expansion and falls back in on itself, reversing the Big Bang process in a final 
huge collapse.
16
 In his book, Hawking discusses developments in various cosmological 
models of the universe, including the notion of the Big Bang/Big Crunch, but he moves away 
from his own earlier thinking – moves from the Big Bang singularity where space-time has a 
boundary with a beginning at the Big Bang, towards a cosmological model in which space-
time is finite but has no boundary (that is: has no beginning or moment of creation). Thus, 
instead of a model with a beginning (and possibly a concluding) singularity, a sort of edge at 
which the laws of science break down, the situation in Hawking's present model is that "the 
boundary condition of the universe is that it has no boundary. The universe would be 
completely self-contained and not affected by anything outside itself. It would neither be 
created nor destroyed. It would just BE". Thus, Hawking tells us, there would be no need "to 
appeal to God or some new law to set the boundary conditions for space-time".
17
 
 
Hawking hastens to remind us that the idea that time and space are finite without boundary 
is only a proposal. Like "any other scientific theory", he says, "it may initially be put forward 
for aesthetic or metaphysical reasons, but the real test is whether it makes predictions that 
agree with observation".
18
 In Hawking's case, his attempt to solve via mathematics the 
3 
 
various problems to do with versions of the Big Bang model of the universe
19
 has led him to 
his present suggestion, but he can see that it is difficult to confirm the theory by observation 
because, firstly, it is still uncertain which theory of the universe successfully combines 
general relativity and quantum mechanics; and secondly, because any model describing the 
whole universe in detail would be much too complicated mathematically for the calculation 
of exact predictions. Like Kierkegaard's Johannes Climacus in Concluding Unscientific 
Postscript,
20
 Hawking sees that one has to make simplifying assumptions and 
approximations, and even then the task of extracting predictions is massive – we could never 
be certain of a theory. Hawking also makes clear that the singularities of the Big Bang (and 
possible Crunch), together with the singularities that belong to the phenomenon of black 
holes, would still appear in the state of real time; that is, he has not completely cancelled 
out the results of his earlier work on singularities.
21
 
 
Nonetheless, it would seem that, in Hawking's view, theoretical physics will soon arrive at 
the complete grand unification theory of the four forces to be found in nature, the theory 
explaining what the universe was like at the beginning and why it behaves as it does today, 
and it would seem as if Hawking's latest model implies the exclusion of singularity, or the 
hope that it will be possible to exclude it.
22
 Hawking's latest model of the universe is 
therefore one in which it seems as if there is no place for a beginning or a moment of 
creation and, if there is no beginning in the sense of an edge or point at which the laws of 
science break down and where one needs to appeal to a creator God or to some new 
principle of origin, then (as Hawking points out) knowing the workings of the universe 
becomes identical with "knowing the mind of God".
23
 
 
Yet, despite his present conclusion, Hawking does not seem able to let go of the question of 
why we and the universe exist. The work of both Hawking and others reveals that the 
universe seems neither totally deterministic nor totally arbitrary.
24 
 Hawking admits that, for 
the universe to permit life as we know it, it has to be "finely adjusted". "The odds against a 
universe like ours emerging out of something like the Big Bang are enormous ... there are 
clearly religious implications whenever you start to discuss the origins of the universe."
25
 
Hawking's latest model must not, therefore, be understood as a deliberate effort to get rid 
of the notion of a God.
26
 Rather, the idea that the universe "just is" stems from his 
calculations towards a complete Grand Unified Theory, leaving him still struggling with the 
question why. 
 
In an attempt to deal with this fundamental question, Hawking and his colleagues have 
posited and considered the validity of the anthropic principle as an explanation, a principle 
which states that "we see the universe the way it is because, if it were different, we would 
not be here to observe it": (paraphrased by Hawking as: "We see the universe the way it is 
because we exist")
27
 though unfortunately it is also developed in other forms in which it is 
stated that a universe without an observer is no universe, a universe without evolved life 
could not have come into existence at all; "the universe is the way it is because we have 
evolved within it".
28 
 With the first statement, the principle makes sense to the extent that, 
for life to have evolved as we know and experience it, certain conditions have to be met; but 
in the latter statements the question is begged as to what a universe is, for it to deserve the 
name universe, and, even worse, the cart is finally put before the horse in the thought that 
our evolution is the cause of the universe being the way it is. Hawking objects to the 
implication that the vast universe exists for the sake of some creatures on a minor planet, 
but he does not seem to have noticed 1) that the first form of the statement tells us nothing 
about why the universe came to be, only that we need certain conditions in order to exist in 
it; and 2) from a philosophical angle, when talking about universes with and without people, 
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reasons need to be given for denying the title "universe" to a cosmological construction 
without humans. Thirdly, there is apparently no objection from Hawking's side to the 
thought that our evolution can be the cause/reason why the universe is.
29
 
 
There is also a sub-confusion running through the texts on this principle, in that the posited 
laws about the universe are confused with the universe in itself; that is, while it makes sense 
to say that laws and theories cannot be stated on the basis of calculation and observation 
unless there are human observers to do the work, and one must include the history of 
physics and the cosmological sciences as part of the universe's history, these laws and their 
workings up to the present moment are still not identical with their events in the universe 
and still have nothing final to say about the universe's "why". Science still cannot go back to 
before the Big Bang singularity or beyond the bare fact of the existence of the universe. 
 
Thus, throughout his book, Hawking wrestles with the problem of the "why" of the universe, 
but, like many others (and because of the results of his scientific work), though he still talks 
of the possibility of a creator God, he seems to shy away from it.
30
 Although rightly he points 
out that to posit such a creator only pushes back the question so that we ask "why" God 
instead of "why" the universe,
31
 thus getting into an infinite regression regarding God's 
origin instead of a cosmological singularity, Hawking's latest model of the universe seems to 
take the gradual edging of God out of the scientific universe a step further
32
 to the point 
where humankind is alone in a vastness ultimately explicable in its entirety in terms of 
natural laws and forces. 
 
If we now look closely at Kierkegaard's works and papers, it becomes very clear that 
Kierkegaard posits a universe definitely created by God. Unlike Hawking, however, 
Kierkegaard makes no attempt to explain the universe with the help of science. While 
admitting the validity of certain scientific pursuits, he is suspicious of attempts by scientists 
to explain human existence
33
 and, instead, makes a theological and philosophical leap of 
faith in positing a God who has created the world out of nothing. In this, Kierkegaard is 
firmly in the tradition of the Christian Doctors of the Church: Augustine, Anselm and 
Aquinas, and also of Balle's Lutheran Catechism: the world, the universe, originates from the 
hands of a creator God who made it out of nothing, that is: did not make it out of anything.
34
 
 
Also implicit in this thought is the idea that God could well have created the world by divine 
choice from eternity: the idea of creation is independent of a temporal beginning.
35
 
Following the Christian tradition (including Balle's Catechism), Kierkegaard in his writings 
depicts God as Spirit, eternal, almighty, all-knowing, all-wise, omnipresent, good, merciful, 
holy, just and truthful.
36 
 Kierkegaard's God is also unchangeable, personal and the Father of 
mankind; he is love, loving all people equally and wanting people to love him, having created 
mankind in his image.
37 
God is also infinite and invisible, but he is active throughout world 
history in which his providence is manifested even in small things; his presence is necessary 
to the world every second; he creates and sustains the world, his love is with human beings 
in everything they do.
38
 
 
Yet Kierkegaard is a dualist: he posits a qualitative difference between God and humankind 
and makes a division between time and eternity. He follows traditional Christian theology 
with its notions of man's creation by God, his fallenness, his redemption in the God-man 
Christ, a redemption through grace not just for this world, but for ever in heaven after the 
individual's death.
39
 Eternity is eternity and time is time, the latter an infinite succession of 
discrete moments which disappear – it "passes by".
40 
 Kierkegaard depicts eternity and time 
as two fundamentally different realms: the world, as part of the realm of time, is the realm 
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of the egocentric and the extensive; heaven, eternity, is the realm of the intensive, of the 
God of perfect altruism and self-sacrifice.
41
 The revealed God in Christ is therefore the 
humble, suffering servant: the high God relates himself paradoxically to appearance in the 
form of human lowliness. The individual who aspires to eternal life must therefore become 
like God, give up egocentricity and die to the world.
42 
 Time and eternity can, therefore, be 
viewed not just as opposite each other, but as in opposition to each other where human 
nature is concerned. Yet since the individual is situated in time, the temporal moment can 
be seen as ambiguous: the moment is an atom of time but it can also become an atom of 
eternity, "a continuous state of fulfilment" in which the individual, situated on "the 
boundary where time and eternity touch each other", each moment uses time in striving to 
develop the initial potentiality of the eternal self through ethical-religious choice.
43  
Yet not 
only can the character of the temporal moment change from mankind's side, it can also 
change from God's side, as it does when the invisible, unknowable God startlingly intervenes 
in creation and enters time at the eternal moment of the incarnation of Christ, providing 
both pattern for imitation and the atonement.
44
 Kierkegaard's universe is therefore very 
different from that of Hawking. For Kierkegaard even the word "universe" signifies 
something different, namely that the whole creation serves and points to only one Lord, God 
the poet, who is lord of all possibilities, who watches carefully over, and is involved in, 
creation, and finally includes himself in and fulfils it, demonstrating that the basic force of 
the universe is love, a love that can now be received as well as given by God through Christ.
45
 
 
It is also interesting to note that the first ten lines of Balle's Catechism learned by Judge 
William (Kierkegaard) as a child begin as follows: "It is highly important for us human beings 
that we learn to know God, since we otherwise would not be able to understand how the 
world has come into existence".
46
 Thus, on this view, one comes to know the universe 
through knowing God, and not vice-versa.
47
 
 
Yet Kierkegaard and Hawking can be seen as being in agreement on certain points, though 
on different grounds. For example, Kierkegaard agrees with Hawking here that the universe 
is neither arbitrary nor deterministic, but – whereas Hawking rejects arbitrariness because 
the universe can be interpreted in terms of laws yet with no place for Laplacian determinism 
– Kierkegaard speaks of possibility and necessity in existence and of a creator God who has 
foreknowledge but does not predetermine.
48
 Both men agree that humankind is finite, 
limited, concerning knowledge: Hawking points to the factor of Heisenberg uncertainty, but 
he also realises that the increase of specialisation in knowledge means that it is not possible 
for people to master more than small areas of science. Kierkegaard posits limitation and 
finitude as arising from God's creator activity: a human being is a "derived spirit" set within 
the boundaries of the finite, and the fact of finitude limits a person in his or her search for 
knowledge.
49
 
 
It is, however, concerning this point of agreement about the limits of human knowledge that 
I would like to argue that we must look to the thought of Kierkegaard and not to the 
theoretical physics of Hawking, when we consider the question of the existence of God, the 
"why" of the universe. For although (like Kierkegaard) Hawking accepts the limitations of 
human knowledge, unlike Kierkegaard he seems to do so only in theory. In practice he does 
not seem to see the implications of this thought for his work. As Hawking admits, when he 
reaches a point of limitation, he employs Occam's razor and cuts out all features of models 
of the universe which cannot be observed.
50
 For example, when Hawking encounters the 
problem of the Big Bang singularity, where theory breaks down so one cannot work back to 
before the Big Bang, he excludes from his initial model any pre-Big Bang events and their 
consequences.
51 
 Although in his book he has several references to the idea of God in a pre-
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singularity state,
52
 later he works his way to a mathematical model of the universe that 
excludes Big Bang singularity and the need of a creator.
53 
 Despite the fact therefore, that (as 
we saw earlier) he points out that his latest model of the universe (finite time and space 
without boundary) is "just a proposal" that "cannot be deduced from some other principle" 
and it may not be easy to see whether his model makes predictions that agree with 
observation,
54
 he fails to see the implication of this, that here he needs the help of Johannes 
Climacus to see that his theory in the last end must be truth viewed as an objective uncer-
tainty held fast in (here) an intellectual faith commitment.
55
 
 
Since Hawking does, in fact, rely on the factuality of his latest model of the universe, if only 
as a possibility, this leads him from an apparent agnosticism concerning the possibility of 
God's existence towards the state of having no need of that hypothesis, and this in turn 
appears to lead him a step further in his use of Occam, for Hawking not only excludes the 
mathematically non-observable area of his universe prior to a Big Bang, attempting instead 
to eliminate its singularity, he also excludes areas that fall outside the mathematics of 
theoretical physics. He presupposes that the question of the initial state of the universe is a 
matter solely for theoretical physics (tested as far as possible by the observations of 
science), but he does not seem to consider that philosophy or religion could have anything 
concrete to say about his efforts to solve the "why" of the universe. Thus, he rejects at least 
some fields of research as a waste of time, particularly attempts to link physics with religion 
and also the field of parapsychology.
56 
 
Yet when Hawking excludes non-observable, non-quantifiable material from his research, he 
has unwittingly already begged a number of questions, not least that there are only the four 
forces as the basis of everything – that there are no other existent and non-quantifiable 
forces.
57
 Thus his attention is turned away from the condition of the human observer (except 
concerning the fate of the atoms of our bodies) to the observation of particles and planets, 
to the singularity situation of Big Bangs and black holes.
58
 The individual takes his place in 
Hawking's universe as part of the on-going stream of matter and energy, while the 
interesting singularity attached to the human personality, the death-event in the lives of 
human beings, is ignored. It is here, however, that Kierkegaard comes into his own in that, in 
his thinking, he clarifies for us the other questions begged by Hawking. 
 
First, Kierkegaard makes a very careful distinction between subject and object. Not only does 
Kierkegaard/Climacus view objective truth as objectively uncertain, he also makes a careful 
distinction between the subjective truth of a genuine faith commitment (whether to a 
proposition or a way of life) and the uncertainty of objective truth. Also, in order to prevent 
the objective truth of mathematics from being confused with objective historical truth, he 
makes an additional distinction between a logical and an existential system.
59
 Thus, while 
giving the realm of mathematics its proper place as a method or system of logic, he leads us 
away from intellectual attempts to arrive at the ultimate historical "why" of the universe. It 
is not that Kierkegaard is afraid to raise these questions, for he does so,
60
 but – since he is 
concerned with the "how" rather than the "what" of existence
61
 – the historical "why" of the 
universe does not arise for him as an issue in the field of objective knowledge. 
 
So, whereas Hawking's book is permeated with the question of whether one could answer 
the question of the universe's ultimate origin, Kierkegaard, with respect to the notion of a 
creator God, makes clear that it is presupposed as the belief-basis for existential ethical-
religious living. For Kierkegaard, the attempt to prove the existence of God is absurd,
62
 and 
he firmly moves the originator of the universe from the sphere of the objective to the sphere 
of the subjective. If one opts to believe in a God, and a personal God at that, then He is not a 
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"thing" out in the far regions of space-time or beyond, but a subject; thus the being of 
Kierkegaard's God is one of pure, unselfish, personal, loving subjectivity. God and human 
beings belong to the realm of subject, although, as a synthesis of the temporal and the 
eternal, humankind also shares in the objective, material aspect of creation.
63 
 Since (as we 
have seen) there is a qualitative difference between God and humankind, entailing the 
paradox that God is both infinitely close and infinitely far away, the way for the human-being 
subject to find and relate to God-as-subject is on a person-to-person basis: instead of 
treating God as a possible remote object to be discovered by the observer with the help of 
mathematics, the individual has to make an "inland journey"
64
 into him or herself in order to 
discover and face up to what makes God so infinitely distant, namely the factor of sin. 
Second, through making a distinction been the temporal and the eternal, and between the 
subjectivity of the human being and objectivity, Kierkegaard points to the possibility of other 
non-material energies and forces and draws attention to the significance of human selfhood 
for Hawking's enterprise. On the one hand, Kierkegaard leaves room for another very real 
force that does not figure at all in descriptions coming from the field of theoretical physics, 
namely the power or force of love stemming from the realm of eternity as one of pure, 
loving Spirit.
65
 On the other hand, Kierkegaard's description of the self sets a question-mark 
by Hawking's apparent presupposition that the human as an observer formulates laws and 
makes discoveries only through the purely intellectual or mind-side of the personality.
66 
 
Such a presupposition, too, tends to rest upon, or at least encourage, a purely brain-centred, 
materialistic view of personality, so that we come back to the activity of excluding any 
evidence that does not support this picture. 
 
In his relational view of the self, however, Kierkegaard gives a description that, pre-dating 
the brain-centred model, is nonetheless relevant to the question of Hawking's universe. 
Especially through his pseudonyms Climacus and Anti-Climacus, Kierkegaard outlines the self 
as a synthesis of body and soul, a being that feels, thinks and wills. Further, this initial self 
with which each person starts has a potentiality for eternal life which can be realised 
through a correct ethical-religious relation to the ideal self, or the self as it should be, based 
on the God-relationship.
67
 Climacus might be our contemporary, responding to Hawking, 
when he regrets the tendency to make the intellectual aspect of the self – thought – the 
highest element in the individual's personality. He points out that, in existence, thought, 
imagination and feeling are co-ordinate, while Anti-Climacus urges the importance of the 
capacity of the imagination in relating to ideality, but underlines that the will is the finally 
decisive element of our personality.
68
 
 
From this picture of the self we can point to two features relevant for Hawking: first, that the 
nature of the self is more complex as a receptor of information and in its roots than 
Hawking's approach apparently suggests; and second, the aspect of the self that wills is vital 
in the choices we make, both morally and in the choice of world-view and what we will or 
will not consider as evidence in relation to it. In other words, the modern tendency to give 
priority of significance to the mind seen as reasoning or rationalising agent is, in 
Kierkegaard's view, an error of considerable magnitude. We respond to, learn about, the 
universe with the whole of our being, not just through one part of our brain. 
 
Is, however, Kierkegaard's view of God, the universe and the self just another world-picture 
without any real justification? Are we left with only the bare Kierkegaardian option of 
chancing our arm on his view or of taking offence
69
 and retreating into the probability of a 
Hawking-style universe? The answer to this question appears to be "no". There is evidence 
to support Kierkegaard's God-based model of the universe, and of the observational kind 
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Hawking looks for from astronomers and applied physicists to support his model, though 
consideration of it must fall outside the scope of this paper.
70
 
 
We can, however, finally be so daring as to suggest that Hawking may have begged the 
question of the correct starting-point for a fundamental quest concerning the "why" of the 
universe. For it may be that Kierkegaard's model can shed light on Hawking's search for a 
simple unifying principle, though in a different direction from that of the investigation of the 
four forces. We have noted that Kierkegaard comes to posit the two realms of time and 
eternity as polar opposites. In his book, Hawking also speaks of opposites, namely particles 
and anti-particles, making the point that matter in our universe is made out of positive 
energy.
71
 While not wanting in any way to posit a direct analogy between a principle of 
physics and Kierkegaard's two realms, I would like to suggest that in Kierkegaard's view lies a 
clue for Hawking: instead of making the search for the unification of the four forces, it might 
prove more fruitful for Hawking to examine the notion of Kierkegaard's two basic realms 
with the thought that the looked-for principle of unity or simplicity might rest on an 
existential difference between plus and minus or zero and one, and have an essential 
bearing on the nature and condition of the human self. Put in Kierkegaard's words, this 
would read that "the positive is recognisable by the negative", "to die to the world is the 
condition for seeing God", or "becoming nothing in this world is the condition for being able 
to become something in the other world ... they are inversely related to each other".
72
 
 
We can conclude, then, with two pictures of the universe: Kierkegaard's, which clearly posits 
areas of uncertainty and difficulty and of the unknown, but does take them into 
consideration as a part of his model; and Hawking's, in which, in his exclusion of specific 
areas outside physics,
73
 he is probably excluding what might lead him in the direction of 
what appears to be his fundamental concern – the why of the universe and whether or not 
there is a God as its originator. Hawking's model is exciting, but his concentration on the 
universe's "why" seems to be at the expense of the "what" and the "how”. Thus, far from 
being in some way outmoded, I would like to suggest that it is Kierkegaard's picture of the 
universe that in the last resort takes all phenomena into consideration and does not beg 
questions. Instead, he underlines the notion of belief, risk and offence and, where God is 
concerned, points away from intellectual observation to the possible choice of existential 
commitment and experience through the leap of faith. Unlike Hawking, Kierkegaard clearly 
perceives the same truth about the search for God that was enunciated by the author of The 
Cloud of Unknowing: "He may well be loved, but not thought. By love he can be caught and 
held, but by thinking never".
74
 
 
 
APPENDIX 
Concerning the validity of Kierkegaard's world-view, there is, in fact, evidence to support it, 
though what follows does not in any way pretend to be the result of exhaustive 
investigation. Rather, it is offered as indications suggesting further lines of inquiry. 
 
First, there is an amount of evidence pointing to the fact that we do not acquire knowledge 
only through the actively reasoning brain. It seems to be an acknowledged fact that ideas 
and inspired flashes of genius often occur when the individual concerned is relaxed and not 
consciously using the rationalising aspect of the brain; conscious attention to a problem can 
often hinder its solution. This phenomenon is pointed out by, for example, Rosalind 
Heywood in her research into parapsychological experience,
75
 but Hawking himself gives us 
an example of an important scientific breakthrough he made, not actively at work, but when 
he was relaxed off duty at home.
76 
 If we look at the matter from the perspective of religion, 
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then Kierkegaard's emphasis – not only on the limitation of the intellectual side of the mind 
but also on the need for the humble leap of faith instead of pride and arrogant 
intellectualism – corresponds well to the emphasis in religious literature on putting aside 
knowledge and the activity of the mind in order to achieve knowledge of God, a God-
relationship, through a humble will.
77
 
 
Second, that a brain-centred view of personality is possibly not the true picture is also 
indicated in neurology. For example, neurologist C. W. M. Whitty in a paper Changes in 
Conduct and Personality Following Localized Brain Lesions, points out that, with time, after 
such damage it seems as if "the personality has some self-organising capacity, and draws 
together and re-imposes its pattern on the functioning of the damaged brain". One can also 
note that Wilder Penfield's research into the mind seems to indicate a clear distinction 
between the human brain and the human "I".
78
 These observations, indicating the 
correctness of a non-brain-centred view of personality, are supported by considerable 
evidence from the fields of parapsychology and religious experience. (Such evidence may 
also imply that the individual does in fact survive death.)
79
 
 
Third, we can then turn to two areas of research rejected by Hawking, namely that of 
parapsychology and religion. Hawking views parapsychology as a fraudulent "waste of 
time",
80
 but the work of serious researchers
81
 such as Rosalind Heywood and others 
indicates the validity of this field of research and tends to support the Kierkegaardian rather 
than the Hawking picture of the universe where the nature of the self is concerned.
82 
Similarly, although Hawking speaks negatively of the attempt to link religion with physics, it 
is difficult to dismiss the work of (for example) Alister Hardy and the Religious Experience 
Research Centre in Oxford whose careful work seems to indicate the possibility of a spiritual 
dimension beyond our world.
83
 This again seems to agree with the Kierkegaard rather than 
the Hawking model of the universe and coincides with insights from the classics of world 
spiritual literature.
84
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